Add to ORKGA seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or high, and is the seller’s private information. The seller has strictly convex preferences that satisfy a single-crossing condition. Buyers compete by posting menus of non-exclusive contracts, so that the seller can simultaneously and privately trade with several buyers. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium. Aggregate equilibrium allocations are unique. Any traded contract must yield zero profit. If a quality is indeed traded, then it is traded efficiently. Depending on parameters, both qualities may be traded, or only one o
We consider the problem of trade between a price setting party who has private information about the...
We study games in which several principals design mechanisms in the presence of privately informed a...
This article surveys recent attempts at characterizing competitive allocations under adverse selecti...
A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or h...
A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or h...
A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or h...
We consider an exchange economy in which a seller can trade an endowment of a divisible good whose q...
We consider an exchange economy in which a seller can trade an endowment of a divisible good whose q...
International audienceA seller can trade an endowment of a perfectly divisible good, the quality of ...
Consider a seller who can trade an endowment of a perfectly divisible good, the quality of which sh...
A buyer of a divisible good faces several identical sellers. The buyer’s preferences are her private...
I construct an efficient mechanism for competitive markets with adverse selection. In the mechanism,...
We study trading situations in which several principals on one side of the market compete to serve p...
We consider the problem of trade between a price setting party who has private information about the...
We study games in which several principals design mechanisms in the presence of privately informed a...
This article surveys recent attempts at characterizing competitive allocations under adverse selecti...
A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or h...
A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or h...
A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or h...
We consider an exchange economy in which a seller can trade an endowment of a divisible good whose q...
We consider an exchange economy in which a seller can trade an endowment of a divisible good whose q...
International audienceA seller can trade an endowment of a perfectly divisible good, the quality of ...
Consider a seller who can trade an endowment of a perfectly divisible good, the quality of which sh...
A buyer of a divisible good faces several identical sellers. The buyer’s preferences are her private...
I construct an efficient mechanism for competitive markets with adverse selection. In the mechanism,...
We study trading situations in which several principals on one side of the market compete to serve p...
We consider the problem of trade between a price setting party who has private information about the...
We study games in which several principals design mechanisms in the presence of privately informed a...
This article surveys recent attempts at characterizing competitive allocations under adverse selecti...